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With this issue, the MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY is inaugurating its Synopsis
ot the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. In order to make this
Synopsis useful and valuable to both military and civilian attorneys, we
have attempted to exclude cases which are limited in application, which are
merely duplicatory, which contain only minor procedural points and to
include cases which would be valuable to counsel and presiding officers
in courts-martial.
This issue contains selected decisions of the Court of Military Appeals
from the date of its first decision, November 8, 1951, through October 20,
1952. The Uniform Code of Military justice, 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50
U.S.C. §§551-736 (1950), will hereinafter be cited as UCMJ, and the
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951, as MCM, 1951. The decisions of the
Court of Military Appeals do not. as yet, appear in bound form so that
it is necessary to cite them without reference to volume and page numbers
and to include in the citation the date of the decision. The title heads
employed in the Synopsis are assimilated to the title heads in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
APPOINTMENT AND COMPOSrrON OF COURTS-MARTIAL. Appointment
of'trial counsel: Accuser. It is permissable for one to serve as accuser and
trial counsel in the same action, "however questionable as a matter of
discretion."'
Appointment of trial counsel; Investigating officer. Where the trial
counsel has conducted an informal investigation of the facts surrounding
the offense in order to sign the charges as accuser, he is not an "investigating
officer"2 and is therefore eligible to serve as trial counsel. 8
Who may convene. Where an officer is "so closely connected to the
offense that a reasonable person would conclude that he had a personal
interest in the matter," he is ineligible to act as convening authority4 of the
court-martial or as reviewing officer 5
Who may serve on courts-martial: Investigating officer. Where a
member of the court-martial has, as security watch, conducted an informal
*This issue of the Military Synopsis was prepared for publication by Lewis L. Cosor
and edited by Robert Earle Dooley. The idea for this Synopsis was conceived by John
J. Blair.
1. United States v. Lee, USCMA, March 13, 1952.
2. Article 27, UCMJ.
3. United States v. Lee USCMA , March 13, 1952.
4. Articles 22, 23, UCMJ.
5. United States v. Cordon, .USCMA . , March 19, 1952.
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investigation into the facts surrounding the offense he is an "investigating
officer" and ineligible to sit on the court-martial, notwithstanding the fact
that no formal investigation was required or conducted. Failure on the part
of the defense counsel to object to this officer's membership does not
constitute a waiver to this prejudicial error.7
GENERAL PROVISIONS. Persons subject to the Code: Civilians. Civilians
are not presumed to be subject to military law. The party claiming military
jurisdiction, therefore, has the burden of proving that jurisdiction is clearly
conferred by statuteYs
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE. Charges and specifications. Tie failure to have
charges sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths as
required" is an error of form rather than substance and failure to make
timely objection to any error of form operates as a waiver.' 0
Charges and specifications: Swearing. There is no distinction between
failing to swear to charges and swearing to them before an 6fficer not
qualified to administer oaths.1'
Compulsory self-incrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination 12
is of such importance that it must be liberally construed in favor of the
accused. Where there is a question as to whether the accused waived the
privilege all doubts should be resolved in his favor."
The privilege against self-incrimination1 4 is freedom from compulsory
self-incrimination. This compulsion may be either physical or mental, but
to establish a violation of the privilege the accused must show that there
was an act which denied him free choice. 15
Compulsory self-incrimination: Confessions. If the law officer or presi-
dent of a court martial could, as a result of the workings of a reasonable
mind, conclude that a confession was voluntarily made, the Court of Mili.
tary Appeals must affirm its admissibility. 0
Where a confession is obtained under duress, whether this duress has
a continuing effect and thereby renders inadmissible a second, freely made
confession is dependent upon the facts of the individual case.,"
The test to determine whether a confession was involuntary and,
therefore, inadmissible is whether the threats, promises, or inducements
used to produce the confession were of such a serious and substantial nature
6. Article 25. UCMJ.
7. United States v. Bound, - USCMA_ , March 13, 1952.
8. United States v. Marker USCMA ., May 19, 1952.9. Article 30(a), UCMJ.
10. United States v. May,- USCMA ., February 13, 1952.
11, Ibid.
12, Article 31, UCMJ.
13. United States v. Welch,- USCMA Ko May 27, 1952.
14. Article 31, UCMJ.
15. United States v. Welch, USCMA ., May 27, 1952.
16. United States v. Monge,-.....USCMA ., January 8, 1952.
17. Ibid.
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that they could have impaired the defendant's freedom of will and might
have induced hint to confess to a crime he did not commit.' 8
PUNrrIvE AR'rICLES. Whether an offense is of such slight importance
that accused should be tried by a summary court-martial or punished under
the commanding officer's non-judicial punishment' instead of being tried
by a special court-martial is a matter within the discretion of the com-
manding officer and the officers in the chain of command. 20
Absence without leave. One period of absence, single and uninter-
rupted, can be the basis of only one charge. The offense of absence without
leave is consummated on the date of original absence and is not a con-
tinuing offense.21
Desertion. The difference between desertion 22 and absence without
leaveC2 3 is primarily one of intent which is generally a question to be
decided by the trial forum. 24
The joint resolution of Congress2' ended the war for the purpose of
punishment of the crime of desertion in all the armed services of the
country. 20
Desertion: Condonation. Constructive condonation must be asserted
as a defense prior to the conclusion of the trial or it will be considered
waived. It cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.27
In order for an accused to effectively plead constructive condonation,
he must have been restored to duty by an officer exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction;28 no other officer can constructively condone?9
Desertion: Intent. Since being absent without leave coupled with any
of three specific intents constitutes the offense of desertion,30 a specification
alleging merely a general intent will be regarded as alleging only the intent
not to return. If, upon such a specification, the law officer instructs as to
the other two specific intents this is error as a matter of law. Where it
appears from the evidence that the finding of guilty may have been based
on one of the other two intents the conviction will be reversed?'
Failure to obey order or regulation. The imposition of military duties
for the sole purpose of punishment tends to degrade such duties and is,
therefore, illegal. As a result, failure to obey such an order will not subject
18. United States v. Colbert, USCMA . , October 3, 1952.
19. Article 15, UCMJ.
20. United States v. Messenger USCMA , October 6, 1952.
21. Article 86, UCMA, United States v. Emerson, - USCMA , No-
vember 14, 1951.
22. Article 85, UCMJ.
23. Article 86, UCMJ.
24. United States v. McCrary,. USCMA , November 8, 1951.
25. 61 STAT. 449 (1947).
26. United States v. Meyer,- USCM.A._--_., February 8, 1952.
27. United States v. Minor, - USCMA ., July 30, 1952.
28. Paragraph 68f, MCM, 1951.
29.-United States v. Minor, - USCMA. , July 30, 1952.
30, Article 86, UCMJ.
31. United States v. Hemp, USCMA---.. , April 8, 1952.
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one to prosecution for willful disobedience of the lawful order of a superior
officer.32
The command of a superior officer is presumed to be legal and the
burden of proving otherwise is upon the person alleging its illegality. 33
Failure to obey order or regulation: Camp regulation. A camp regu-
lation constitutes a "lawful order" and failure to obey such regulation
subjects the offender to prosecution.34
General article. An attempt to entice other members of the service
to engage in sexual intercourse with a female is an act "to the prejudice
of good order and discipline" and is, therefore, punishable under the general
article. 35
Misbehavior before the enemy. A unit or organization is "before the
enemy" 350 when it is in position to participate in either offensive or defensive
battle, and its weapons are capable of delivering fire on the enemy, whose
weapons are, in turn, capable of delivering fire upon that unit."7
REvIEw or COURTS-MARTIAL. Correction of prejudicial error. Prejudicial
error can be corrected in certain instances by reduction of the sentence
by the reviewing agency or agencies. 38
Review by board of review. If the Court of Military Appeals has not
obtained jurisdiction of a case, the board of review retains it and may
modify or reverse its previous holding to make the decision conform with
the law.30
When the board of review reinstates a conviction which it had previ-
ously disapproved this does not subject the accused to double jeopardy
since jeopardy does not attach until "review of the case has been fully
completed.40
Review by the Court of Military Appeals. rflie Court of Military
Appeals will not substitute its judgment for that of the triers of fact. Where
there is substantial evidence in the record to support a conviction the court
will not set aside the verdict.4 When there is merely some evidence the
Court will set aside a conviction. 42
The Court of Military Appeals will confine itself to correcting errors
32. Article 92, UCMJ. United States v. Trani USCMA , April 9,
1952.
33. United States v. Trani, USCMA_.. , April 9, 1952.
34. Article 92, UCMJ, United States v. Snyder, USCMA . June 5,
1952.
35. Article 134, UCMJ, United States v. Snyder, USCMA____ ., June 5,
1952.
36. Article 99, UCMJ.
37. United States v. Sperland, USCMA____ ., September 3, 1952.
38. United States v. Jones,- USCMA - -. , April 14, 1952.
39. United States v. Reeves,_ .USCMA - , May 15, 1952.
40. Article 44, UCMJ, United States v. Zimmerman,- -USCMA
October 6, 1952.
41. United States v. McCrary, .USCMA. _ , November 8, 1951.
42. United States v. O'Neal,_ USCMA ., February 7, 1952.
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of law and leave to the forum of original jurisdiction questions of fact.48
When a substantial right of the accused is denied, the Court of Military
Appeals will not speculate as to the extent of the damage done but will
reverse the conviction. 44
Where an accused is convicted under several specifications, some of
which must be reversed as a matter of law, but his sentence does not exceed
the maximum punishment under those convictions which are valid, the
Court of Military Appeals will not approve the sentence.4 5
TRIAL PROcEDURE. Admissibility of evidence. Where it is apparent
that the defense understood its right to object to the admissibility of
evidence and failed to do so, the Court of Military Appeals will not review
an assignment of error based on the inadmissibility of such evidence except
in instances of "manifest miscarriage of justice." 48
Admissibility of evidence: Character witnesses. The testimony of a
character witness is admissible, not only for mitigation or extenuation, but
also to prove the innocence of the accused and it is reversible error to admit
such testimony only after the findings and prior to sentencing. 47
Admissability of evidence: Dying declarations. Dying declarations are
admissible as evidence when they are made after infliction of a mortal
wound and under a belief that death is certain and when they state the
facts concerning the cause of, and the circumstances surrounding, the
homicide. Such a declaration which states that the homicide was accidental
will be regarded, not as an opinion, but as a "collective statement of fact
based on known circumstances. ' 48
Admissability of evidence: Hearsay and leading questions. Isolated and
minor errors by a court-martial as to hearsay and leading questions are not
substantially prejudicial to the rights of the accused and will not justify
reversal but repeated violations of these rules may have the opposite effect.49
Admissibility of evidence: Official records. Official records are admis-
sible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule and there is a pre-
sumption that records emanating from official unit sources are the records
required to be kept and that the person recording knew or had the duty
to know or ascertain the truth of the facts or events recorded."
Admissibility of evidence: Prior convictions. Testimony regarding prior
convictions of the accused is substantially prejudicial to the rights of the
accused and will result in reversal of a conviction unless it is introduced
43. United States v. McCrary,_.__ USCMA . November 8, 1951.
44. United States v. Williams,_ .USCMA , February 21, 1952.
45. United States v. Keith,_..--USCMA , July 3, 1952. The Court, in
this case, left the matter open for different treatment under other fact situations.
For a complete discussion of this problem we recommend that the principle case be
consulted.
46. United States v. Masusock, USCMA . November 9, 1951.
47. United States v. Browning _ USCMA ., August 15, 1952.
48. United States v. DeCarlo USCMA ., December 28, 1951.
49. United States v. Yerger, USCMA__ -, April 7, 1952.
50. United States v. Masusock USCMA -.- , November 9, 1951.
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"to show bad character of the accused where it has been placed in issue by
the defense or to show a course of criminal conduct where such conduct
has a definite relationship to one of the elements of the offense charged."' 1
Admissibility of evidence: Proof of previous convictions. Where there
is a provision for more severe punishment upon proof of previous convic-
tions, 2 "proof" means "competent and legal evidence establishing the facts
in issue" and the unsworn statement of counsel is not evidence in this
respect any more than it is in other matters. 3
Admissibility of evidence: Search and seizure. The privilege of having
the products of an unlawful search and seizure excluded from evidence'4 is
waived by failure to make timely objection.5
54. Paragraph 152, MCM, 1951.
Improper behavior of trial counsel. The trial counsel, as a representative
of the government, has the primary duty to see that justice is done. When
his conduct indicates an intent to deliberately disregard the rules of
evidence in order to influence the court, and it is reasonable that his
remarks may have influenced the court's deliberations, and the rights of the
accused have been substantially prejudiced by his conduct, a conviction
will be reversed. 56
Joint trials. Where several accused are being tried jointly for an offense
growing out of the same "excursion," if they desire to be tried separately
they must make a showing of good cause57 even though this means that
they must open a part of their case for inspection, since a separate trial
under these circumstances is a privilege, not a right.58
Pleas of the accused. Matters pleaded in mitigation and/or extenuation
are not matters inconsistent with a plea of guilty.59
Sessions: Consultations between the court and lav officers. A private
conversation between the court and the law officers from which counsel
are excluded warrants reversal of a conviction regardless of the possibility
of such conversation affecting the finding of the court.00
Voting and rulings. The accused has a basic right to have the law
officer rule on issues "properly raised by his counsel and presenting sub-
stantial questions of law." Wherever this right is abused, the Court of
Military Appeals will reverse a conviction regardless of whether the failure
to rule apparently damaged the accused's case."'
Voting and rulings: Instructions. Where the accused pleads not guilty,
51. United States v. Yerger,. USCMA ., April 7, 1952.
52. Paragraph 127c, MCM, 1951.
53. United States v. Carter, USCMA - , January 18, 19152.
55. United States v. Dupree USCMA.. , September 9, 1952.
56. United States v. Valencia,. USCMA ., June 3, 1952.
57. Paragraph 70d, MCM, 1951.
58. United States v. Evans and Parker, USCMA _ , August 8, 1952.
59. Article 45, UCMJ, United States v. Messenger, - USCMA , Octo-
ber 6, 1952.
60. United States v. Keith, - USCMA - , July 30, 1952.
61. United States v. Berry. USCMA - , March 18, 1952.
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the failure of the law officer of a general court-martial or the president of
a special court-martial to instruct as to the presumption of innocence,
reasonable doubt and burden of proof6 2 is a denial of "military due process,"
is prejudicial to the rights of the accused and necessitates a reversal of a
conviction obtained in such a trial.6 3
Where accused pleads guilty, the failure of the law officer of a general
court-martial or the president of a special court-martial to instruct the court
as to the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt and burden of proof 14
is error as a matter of law but is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused
and the Court of Military Appeals will not invalidate a conviction so
obtained.65
The ruling of the law officer, or president, of a court-martial as to
interlocutory questions must be regarded as the jaw of the case by the
court-martial whether or not this ruling is in fact correct. Failure to so
regard is error. 68
Instructions by the law officer or president of a court-martial must be
complete, clear, simple and unambiguous. 7
Instructions by the law officer or president of a court-martial must
include a statement of the law in regard to properly raised affirmative
defenses. 8
Unless the evidence excludes any reasonable inference that a lesser
crime than the one charged was committed, the law officer must instruct
the court as to the elements of the lesser included offensc(s). "
Incomplete instructions cannot be cured by a reference to the Manual
which contains a complete statement of the elements of the offense.70
Although the Manual says that instruction may be given in the
language of the applicable sub-paragraph, if the language of the sub-
paragraph does not adequately define the offense,7 ' a conviction obtained
on an instruction following such language may be reversed. r2
Instructions: Assault. When the crime charged is assault with specific
intent to commit an aggravated offense, it is necessary that the law officer
instruct the court as to the elements of the aggravated offense.23
Where intent is a necessary part of the offense charged, failure to
instruct as to this intent is reversible error.7
Witnesses: Competency. The competency of a child witness is meas-
62. Article 51(c), UICMI J.63. United States v. Clay, - USCMA, November 27, 1951.
64. Article 51(c), UCNIJ.
65. United States v. Lucas USCMA , November 8, 1951.
66. United States v. Jones, _ _USCMA. , April 14, 1952.
67. United States v. Rhoden, USCMA , February 26, 1952.
68. United States v. Gin .. .USCMA__ . , July 10, 1952.
69. United States v. Clark, .USCMA , February 29, 1952.
70. United States v. Gilbertson. USCMA - , July 22, 1952.
71. Paragraph 73a, MCM, 1951.
72. United States v. Williams USCMA - , March 14, 1952.
73. ibid.
74. United States v. Hopf USCMA.__ . , August 14, 1952.
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ured by intelligence and a sense of duty to tell the truth and not necessarily
by age."'
Witnesses: Oaths. Where a witness states that he has no religion,
it is permissible to use an oath which contains an invocation to a diety
if the witness understands that which is expected of him, although another
type of affirmation may be preferable.70
75. United States v. SlozesUSCMA. November 20, 1951.
76. Ibid.
